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1.  Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes 
specious.  For example, suppose Ned believes that an utterance‘s meaning is its truth-
condition, while Ted insists that the utterance‘s meaning is constituted by the speaker‘s 
communicative intentions à la Grice.  Here one wants to distinguish explananda:  What 
Ned is after is really the utterance‘s (―timeless‖) sentence-meaning; Ted is focusing on 
speaker-meaning, which is not the same, and the two theories are perfectly compatible, 
indeed mutually complementary, accounts of distinct phenomena.   
Or the dispute may prove to be verbal.  Jed and Red agree that a sentence-token 
has both a truth-condition and an illocutionary force, but they disagree over which of 
those two features constitutes the sentence‘s meaning (italics original): Jed says the 
meaning is the truth-condition, force being important but merely pragmatic, while Red 
says the meaning is the force, truth-condition being important but merely the feature that 
determines the speech act‘s locutionary content.  It would be hard to show that that 
disagreement is more than a schoolyard scuffle over who gets to keep the term.  In such a 
dispute, each combatant tries valiantly to reserve and protect the buzzword ―meaning‖ as 
attaching to what s/he feels is the more interesting and striking of the two features.  Lycan 
(1984) offers the ―Double Indexical‖ theory of meaning as the term is used in altercations 
of this kind:    
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MEANING  =def  Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me 
now.   [p. 272]  
 
Or a compatibility may simply go unnoticed.  The classic Verificationism of the 
Positivists is universally thought of as a rival of the Truth-Condition theory.  Yet—though 
I have never seen this so much as noted in print—the Verification theory is not only 
compatible with the Truth-Condition theory but entails it.  For a Verificationist, a 
sentence‘s verification condition, besides being its meaning, is its truth-condition.  To see 
this, consider a sentence to which the Verificationist would assign a meaning other than 
its face-value or ostensible meaning, such as a sentence about electrons; e.g., the 
Verificationist says, ―An electron has just passed through the cloud chamber‖ means that 
having squeezed the bulb, one sees a trail of grey specks in the chamber, etc.  Now, if a 
sentence means that P, then that sentence is true iff P.  So on the Verificationist analysis, 
―An electron has just passed through the cloud chamber‖ would be true iff having 
squeezed the bulb, one sees a trail of grey specks in the chamber, etc.; thus the 
Verificationist theory assigns to that sentence, and to every other sentence to which it 
applies, a truth-condition, and in particular a truth-condition that according to the theory 
is the sentence‘s meaning.  So, to put it provocatively:  Verificationism = the Truth-
Condition theory plus some distinctive advice about how to determine what a given 
sentence‘s truth-condition is (viz., by asking how the sentence is verified); the pure Truth-
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Condition theorist‘s complaint against the Verificationist is, at worst, that the advice is 
bad and that the Verificationist gets the truth-conditions wrong.
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Yet of course competition between theories of meaning is often real and 
substantive.  Suppose, rather, that Ted does join Ned in pursuing timeless sentence-
meaning, but that he follows Grice (1968) in arguing that sentence-meaning is not truth-
condition at all, but a complex function of possible speaker intentions; then there is 
genuine disagreement.  Or suppose that while Jed holds that illocutionary force is merely 
a pragmatic, psychological appendage to sentence-meaning (= truth-condition), Red 
insists that the truth-condition properly characterizes, not the sentence, but only the 
underlying propositional-attitude content that partly constitutes the force; genuine 
disagreement again, because Red and Jed have conflicting views of which feature is 
conceptually and/or explanatorily prior.   
 
2.  My concern in this paper is with sentence-meaning, and with a certain sort of 
argument for the Truth-Condition theory of sentence-meaning.  The argument—call it the 
―Determination Argument‖—is intended to establish that sentence-meaning is at least 
truth-condition, whether or not other features such as force (or ―conceptual role‖ or 
implicatures) also deserve to be included as part of ―meaning.‖  In particular, I shall 
confront the argument with some objections suggested by recent ―use‖ theories. 




In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a 
meaning does, and then find something that does that. 
A meaning for a sentence is something that 
determines the conditions under which the sentence is 
true or false.  It determines the truth-value of the sentence 
in various possible states of affairs, at various times, at 
various places, for various speakers, and so on.   (p. 22)  
 
Considered as a defense of the Truth-Condition theory, this passage is sketchy.  
Indeed, it seems more a flat assertion than an argument, or at least to beg the question.  
But now look carefully at its concluding sentence, and note that that sentence does not 
simply presuppose its predecessor.  I read the concluding sentence as freestanding and as 
the argument‘s main premise.  Let us reformulate it, concentrating on Lewis‘ notion of a 
―possible state of affairs.‖ 
He makes it clear that the possible states of affairs that chiefly concern him are 
whole possible worlds. 
 
Contingent sentences depend for their truth value on facts 
about the world, and so are true at some possible worlds 
and false at others.  A possible world corresponds to a 




Lewis construes the idea of a meaning‘s determining a sentence‘s truth-value in set-
theoretic terms, and concludes that a meaning is (in part
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) a function from possible worlds 
to truth-values. 
Lewis‘ conception of a truth-condition is of course that which derives from 
Carnapian intensional logic.  But not all truth-condition theorists work within that format.  
Some eschew the idea of a multiplicity of possible worlds.  For example, Davidson (1965, 
1967, 1973) exhibits a sentence‘s truth-condition merely as the right-hand side of the 
Tarski biconditional directed upon that sentence (e.g., ―‗Platypuses have webbed feet‘ is 
true iff platypuses have webbed feet‖), the biconditional having been derived from a 
Tarskian truth theory for the containing language, and he keeps his treatment strictly 
extensional.  I shall remain neutral both as between these two ways of representing truth-
conditions and also as between metaphysicians who think there is only one world and 
those who contend that there are many merely possible worlds as well as our actual one; 
so I shall pick up Lewis‘ phrase ―a totality of fact,‖ meaning roughly an entire world, and 




The argument‘s first premise is, then, 
 
(1)  A sentence‘s meaning taken together with a totality of fact determines 
the sentence‘s truth-value. 
 
(One-worlders may substitute ―the‖ for ―a‖ in ―a totality of fact.‖) 
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The argument then proceeds as follows.   
 
         (2)  A sentence-meaning is at least a function from possible worlds to 
truth-values.
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   [1] 
 
(3)  Such a function is a truth-condition.   [As conceived in intensional 
logic] 
 
         (4)  A sentence-meaning is at least a truth-condition.   [2,3]   QED 
 
This argument has an epistemological version, given by Field (1977) and Lycan 
(1984), that is perhaps more intuitive: 
 
(1-E)  If you know a sentence‘s meaning and you are omniscient as regards 
fact, then you know the sentence‘s truth-value.   [Seems obvious] 
 
         (2-E)  Knowing a sentence‘s meaning is at least knowing enough to assign 
the sentence a truth-value given a totality of fact.   [1-E] 
 
            (3-E)  To know enough to assign the sentence a truth-value given a totality 
of fact is to know a truth-condition.  [Intensional logic again] 
 
        (4-E)  Knowing a meaning is at least knowing a truth-condition.   [2-E,3-E]  
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I must emphasize again that our conclusions (4) and (4-E) are compatible with 
―meaning‖‘s comprising more than truth-condition, say force as well.  My quarrel will be 
only with those theorists who hold that meaning does not include truth-condition. 
 
3.  Let us consider some objections to these two versions of the Determination 
Argument.  A first problem is that, if taken quite literally, (1-E) is trivially true and too 
weak to support (2-E): So long as ―fact‖ includes linguistic fact, of course an omniscient 
being knows all sentences‘ meanings along with all the nonlinguistic facts.  One of the 
facts that an omniscient being would know is that the sentence ―Platypuses have webbed 
feet‖ means that platypuses have webbed feet, and another is that sentence‘s truth-value; 
so of course the omniscient being can ―assign‖ the sentence a truth-value.  But that does 
nothing to show that an ordinary person‘s knowledge of meaning requires the ability to 
assign truth-values, or that a meaning is the thing on the basis of which the truth-values 
are ordinarily assigned.  Indeed, the same problem afflicts (1) in the original argument; a 
totality of all fact already includes both the sentence‘s meaning and the sentence‘s truth-
value, which (without question-begging) does nothing to show that the meaning is a 
function from worlds to truth-values.   
One‘s first instinct is to qualify (1) and (1-E) by restricting ―fact‖ to nonlinguistic 
fact; that is what I tacitly meant in first uttering (1) and (1-E), and most philosophers 
would not have thought of the present objection very soon.  But such a restriction would 
falsify both those premises, since they would then not hold for metalinguistic sentences.   
 8 
One might know the meaning of ―‗Die‘ is both a noun and a verb‖ and also know all the 
nonlinguistic facts, and still not know whether ―die‖ is both a noun and a verb.   
One‘s natural response is to go hierarchical, and supplement the restricted (1) and 
(1-E) with meta-metalinguistic clauses that do apply to metalinguistic sentences.  But 
then, for just the same reason as before, one would have to restrict those clauses as 
applying only to first-order metalinguistic sentences, and so on up.   Indeed, it looks as 
though a type theory is needed.  We can amend (1) and (1-E) by implicitly quantifying 
over levels of the hierarchy, as in ―For any sentence of level n, ...totality of facts of all 
levels lower than n, ....‖  I see no paradox or other objection to the potential regress 
suggested by this, and I shall say no more of the present issue.  
 
A second objection is that the Determination Argument seems to apply only to 
declarative sentences.  Imperatives and interrogatives, it is widely thought, do not have 
truth-values at all, yet (as the Positivists seem to have missed) they are every bit as 
meaningful as declaratives.   
To this I reply that imperatives and interrogatives do have bipolar semantic values 
which might just as well have been called truth-values even though they normally are not.  
An imperative is obeyed or not (depending on whether its propositional complement turns 
out to be true or false) and a question has the correct answer ―yes‖ or ―no‖ (depending on 
whether its corresponding declarative is true or false).
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  The custom of not calling 
nondeclaratives true and false is only that, a custom, and is expendable; without detriment 
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to the language, we could have called imperatives ―true‖ or ―false‖ depending on their 
being obeyed, and questions ―true‖ or ―false‖ depending on their correct answers.    
 
A third and more trenchant objection calls our attention to deixis:  (1-E) is false, 
because if the sentence in question contains indexicals or other deictic items, one 
certainly can know its meaning, and be factually omniscient, and yet not know the 
sentence‘s truth-value.  If we come into an empty classroom and find written on the 
blackboard, ―I will be out of town tomorrow; class is postponed until Tuesday during 
your normal lab hour,‖ even (nonlinguistic) factual omniscience will not deliver that 
sentence‘s truth-value; we would need to find out who had written it and when and to 
whom.  The same point can be made against (1). 
This is just the same complication for truth-conditional semantics as was noted by 
Kaplan (1977), following Frege, and it should yield to his strategy of distinguishing a 
sentence‘s ―character‖ from the sentence‘s ―content.‖  Content is what we have heretofore 
been calling ―meaning,‖ on the truth-conditional view a set of worlds or a function from 
worlds to truth-values.  Actual content is what is left undetermined by the anonymous 
sentence in our example.  Character is what does determine content given all the relevant 
features of a context of utterance: Faced with our indexical sentence and once given 
utterer, hearer, date, and and time, a competent speaker of English would immediately 
work out its content.  Thus, character is a function from contexts to contents.   
Kaplan argues that the ―m‖-word should be reserved for character rather than for 
content, on the entirely reasonable ground that ordinary English speakers surely know the 
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meanings of everyday indexical sentences even when they do not know the values of the 
contextual parameters that fix the contents of those sentences‘ particular tokens.  In this 
sense, then, (1) and (1-E) are still false, for ―meaning‖ in the sense of character.
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I would contend that (1) and (1-E) are not entirely wrong.  Despite Kaplan‘s 
argument, content in his sense is still a perfectly good thing to mean by ―meaning.‖  Note 
that although in the one way we know the meaning of the sentence on the blackboard, in 
another way we do not: We do not know what its utterer actually said.  In traditional 
terms, we do not know what proposition the token expresses.  And in this sense, so far as 
has been shown, (1) and (1-E) are still true, and the original arguments stand.   
Moreover, ―meaning‖ in the sense of character is still closely tied to truth-
condition, for a character is simply a function from utterance context to ―meaning‖ in the 
sense originally intended.  And, so to speak, its whole point is to be that: Until character 
has done its job by having a full set of contextual features plugged into it, no assertion can 
be made and no communication can take place.
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Nonetheless, recognizing the naturalness of Kaplan‘s preferred usage, I concede 
the following modifications for the case of ―meaning‖ in his sense:   
 
(1+)  A sentence‘s meaning taken together with a context of utterance and a 
totality of fact determines truth-value. 
 
         (2+)  A meaning is at least a function from contexts of utterance to 
functions from possible worlds to truth-values. 
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(3)  A function from worlds to truth-values is a truth-condition.  
 
         (4)  A sentence-meaning is at least a function from contexts of utterance to 
truth-conditions.   [2+,3]  
 
 
(1-E+)  If you know a sentence‘s meaning and you know all the truth-
relevant features of the sentence‘s context of utterance and you are 
omniscient as regards fact, then you know the sentence‘s truth-value 
in the context.   
 
        (2-E+)  Knowing a sentence‘s meaning is at least knowing enough to 
assign the sentence a truth-value given a context and a totality of 
fact.   
 
            (3-E+)  To know enough to assign the sentence a truth-value given a 
context and a totality of fact is to know (at least) a truth-condition for 
an utterance of that sentence in that context.  
 
         (4-E+)  Knowing a meaning is at least knowing (at least) a truth-condition 
in a context.   [2-E+,3-E+]  
 
For all the objection has shown, this treatment is adequate. 
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4.  Against what rivals does the Truth-Condition theory need defending, in the 
early twenty-first century?  Few philosophers of language currently champion a 
verificationist theory of sentence-meaning, or illocutionary theories like Alston‘s (1963, 
2000), or Grice‘s (1968) program based on speaker-meaning.
9
  Currently vital 
competitors seem to be ―use‖ theories of various kinds: ―Conceptual role‖ accounts as 
advocated by Harman (1974, 1975, 1982),
 10
 the more radical inferentialist program of 
Brandom (1983, 1994, 2000), and the more primitive view taken by Horwich (1990, 
1999, 2005).  There is a variety of ideas clustered in this region.  For convenience I shall 
lump them together and call them just, crudely, ―Use‖ theories.   
The general idea of ―Use‖ theories is that linguistic expressions are like chess 
pieces or other game tokens, in that they are deployed in obedience to certain distinctive 
social norms.   A given expression is appropriately tokened in response to this or that 
circumstance (linguistic or nonlinguistic); its tokening demands or at least licenses further 
utterances by the speaker and/or the audience; some utterances require or license 
nonlinguistic acts.  The norms governing all this activity are of course conventional, since 
any word could have been used to mean something other than what it does mean.  (But 
they are not merely, or capriciously or frivolously, conventional.  The whole gigantic 
system of conventions that is a human natural language has evolved and refined itself 
over centuries, in response to pragmatic pressures of many sorts, and no doubt has 
features that are indispensable given the ways in which we are situated in the world and 
what Wittgenstein called our ―forms of life.‖  
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So far, of course, the Truth-Condition theorist need raise no objection.  (Indeed, 
s/he had better not, for what we have so far attributed to ―Use‖ theories are obvious 
truths.)  Rather, the dispute comes when the ―Use‖ theorist adds that a linguistic 
expression‘s meaning is simply and exhaustively constituted by the expression‘s 
normative role in the giant game-like social practice that is the shared language of a 
speech community, and that in particular there is no need to advert to truth-conditions or 
(on some views) even to word-world reference in order to explain the things that theories 
of meaning are charged with explaining.  As I have said, our Truth-Condition theorist 
does not insist that truth-condition suffices for ―meaning,‖ but s/he does insist that truth-
condition is necessary, and that is what the ―Use‖ theorist denies. 
This means that in particular, the ―Use‖ theorist must resist our Lewisian argument 
in both its original and its epistemological versions.  It is far from obvious how s/he might 
do that.  Which of the premises would naturally be denied by someone taking the ―Use‖ 
point of view?  A radical Wittgensteinian who recognized only such primitive types of 
use as in his opening builders‘ game (―Slab!‖) might deny the argument‘s opening 
premise, (1+) or (1-E+) as it might be, contending that meaning in this merely 
behavioristic sense has nothing to do with the checking of sentences against facts.  
Compare examples of purely ritual utterances:  ―Hello,‖ ―Damn,‖ ―Ouch,‖ ―Ha ha,‖ 
―‗Scuse me,‖ ―Thanks,‖ ―Shame!,‖ ―Fore!‖ and the like.  These are the Wittgensteinian‘s 
paradigm.    
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It is tempting for the Truth-Condition theorist to reply that that is the trouble with 
Wittgensteinian ―Use‖ theories.  Such ritualistic utterances are rare exceptions in real 
discourse and should not be taken as paradigmatic; grammatically, they are not even 
complete sentences.   
The grammatical slur is unpersuasive, for arguably some such expressions are 
complete sentences in that they have understood, ellipsized subjects and predicates—
‖[God/I] damn [this/that],‖ ―(Please would) [you] excuse me?,‖ ―[I] thank [you],‖ etc.   I 
think the critical point is better made in Austinian terms of illocutionary force and 
locutionary content:  The vast majority of utterances have both force and content.  
Granted, there are exceptions on each side.  An English sentence shouted across a canyon 
to test the echo may have a content but no force; it is not being used to perform any 
illocutionary act.  Purely ritual expressions such as those listed above have (obvious) 
forces but no locutionary contents.
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  But Truth-Condition theories of meaning are really 
theories of locutionary content, and do not purport to be theories of force; so it is no 
embarrassment to them that there are a few types of utterance that have forces but no 
contents. 
Thus, (1+) and (1-E+) are safe from the radical Wittgensteinian.  But what about 
forces other than the assertive?
12
  Must not (1+) and (1-E+) be modified to accommodate 
those?  No, because in response to the second objection considered in section 3, I have 
already verbally expanded the notion of ―truth-value‖ to cover the bipolar values we 
attach to speech acts of kinds other than the assertive. 
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In any case, current ―Use‖ theorists such as those listed above are not radical 
Wittgensteinians, precisely because they do deal primarily and squarely with normal 
utterances that have locutionary contents.  But they thereby incur a greater difficulty in 
resisting the Lewisian argument. 
 
5.  To appreciate the problem, consider:  Suppose a certain community agrees to 
use certain words—or at any rate sounds and marks—in a peculiar way; e.g., they decide 
to put only ―words‖ with the same number of syllables next to each other in threes, or 
they utter ―sentences‖ only in rhyming pairs, where each string begins with a one-letter 
grapheme and adds one letter successively to each ensuing item.  (This might be a sort of 
community-wide parlor game.)  If someone happened upon this whimsical society and 
knew nothing of the arrangement, s/he would not understand what was going on.  S/he 
might, in time, if s/he were an acute observer, make out all the rules according to which 
the various tokens were being used, and yet the sense of the whole arrangement might 
remain entirely obscure to her/him; s/he might have no notion what, if anything, was 
being said.  S/he might then suspect that s/he has only been watching a game.   
In fact, let us cast this sort of thought-experiment in a more refined form.  Our 
general question is that of how the ―Use‖ theorist might go about distinguishing genuine 
language use from other, but nonlinguistic, rule-governed social practices such as games 
in the ordinary sense.  Now, suppose we have a bunch of colored placards, some of which 
have various designs on them, squiggles of various characteristic shapes.
13
  Nothing very 
elaborate; perhaps each of us has been issued a set of ten placards.  Suppose further that 
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we just make up some simple, stupid little rules for manipulating these squiggles.  For 
example, when the leader holds up the red placard with the thing that looks like the Greek 
letter  on it, everyone is to shout out the sound ―froop‖ and pass one placard to the left.  
(After a short while, what with that rule and others, we will not all have just the same 
cards.)  And when anyone spontaneously holds up any yellow card, the player directly 
opposite must hold up any of the blue ones.  When an even number of people are holding 
up cards bearing hexagons, anyone on the side of the room opposite the leader who has 
any yellow card must pass it to the right.  But if one receives a yellow card with the 
squiggle that looks like a snake on it, s/he must shout out ―crabgrass‖ and bang the table 
twice, and anyone whose surname has at least seven letters should say ―septosieben‖ and 
either raise a red card or run down the hall and back again.  And so on.  Though it sounds 
like Twenty-Three-Man Squamish or some other Mad magazine fantasy, we could quite 
feasibly play the game, according to the set of conventional rules that we have all agreed 
to for manipulating the placards.  
Now of course the point is that so far, the placard game is just a game.  There are 
the tokens and our conventional rules for manipulating them, but as yet, none of this looks 
at all like a genuine language.   
One clear sense in which a social practice qualifies as an actual language is that, 
according to it, one can make noises or inscribe marks and thereby say that P for some 
suitable sentence replacing ‗P‘.  And one of the things that is essential to language is that 
we can say things in it.  (More on this below.) 
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The point can be made using far less fanciful examples, indeed examples of real 
games such as chess and tennis.  To move N-Q3, or to return a serve to the server‘s 
backhand, is not (literally) to say that anything or to ask whether anything or to advise 
anyone to do anything.  Similarly, my point about the placard game is that so far as I can 
see, no indirect discourse is licensed just in virtue of some people‘s playing the game; no 
one has said or asked or requested or suggested...that anything at all.  It seems there is 
something missing.  We are playing a game, and using tokens according to a set of 
conventional rules, and engaging in a social practice that may not only be fun but have 
some larger point; it might even be in some way vital to our way of life.  Yet nobody has 
said anything.  The things the players in these various games have done may have 
significance in some sense, but nobody has made any assertions or performed speech acts 
of any other kinds.  The moves in these games do not have meanings in the linguistic 
sense.  (Contrast the case where spies are using chess moves as an actual secret code; e.g., 
N-Q3 may have conventionally been stipulated to mean ―Take the zircon to Foppa and 
tell him we move tonight.‖)   
 
At this point we must distinguish two possibilities, and turn the present argument 
into a dilemma.  The placard game is importantly underdescribed, with respect to the vital 
concern of truth-conditions.  For someone might argue that if its rules are rich enough and 
advert often enough to ambient conditions, reference and predication will be recoverable 
from the game description.  E.g., suppose there is a rule that whenever the waiter comes 
in, each player holding a card inscribed with a martini-glass shape shouts ―Here, waiter,‖ 
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and is given a martini; whenever anyone sees a robin out the window, s/he says ―Look, 
nobir!‖ and everyone else exclaims ―Ahhh‖; whenever a player says ―Mix please,‖ s/he is 
passed the bowl of snacks by whomever is nearest it; and more in this vein.  One would 
then be tempted to conclude that the glass shape stands for martinis, ―waiter‖ refers to the 
waiter, ―nobir‖ means robin or at any rate bird, and ―mix‖ means snack food.  In that case, 
the placards and vocal utterances specified by the game rules would have meanings, and 
(I would say, in virtue of) truth-conditions.    
In order to set up our dilemma we need not linger over the theory of reference and 
decide what exactly it would take for the placards or utterances to have referential truth-
conditions.  I require only the disjunction: Either the game moves do have truth-
conditions or (by stipulation) they do not.  Call the first scenario the ―Impure Placard 
Game‖ and the second the ―Pure Placard Game.‖  Then I argue as follows.  Moves in the 
Impure Game are meaningful linguistic utterances, but only because they have truth-
conditions.  Moves in the Pure Game are not meaningful linguistic utterances.
14
     
The latter assertion should be obvious, once we have stipulatively removed the 
natural temptation to read reference and truth into the game moves.
15
  Once carefully 
distinguished from the Impure Game, the Pure Game does not seem to be even the 
beginning of an actual language, in particular because it does not exemplify a crucial 
aspect of language: reportability in indirect discourse.  So we have a counterexample to 
―Use‖ theories.  The ―Use‖ theorist‘s conditions are not sufficient for something‘s being a 
language.  
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Now, then, consider a theory of meaning, T, that ostensibly competes with the 
Truth-Condition theory. 
 
(B1)  Either T tacitly incorporates truth-condition and adds something else 
[―conceptual role,‖ force, verification-condition, implicatures,...] or 
T does not. 
 
            (B2)  If T does incorporate truth-condition, then T is not after all a 
competitor of the Truth-Condition theory; further dispute is verbal. 
 
            (B3)  To be correct, T must rule out the Pure Placard Game. 
 
            (B4)  If T does not incorporate truth-condition, then T must rule out the 
Pure Game in some other way. 
 
            (B5)  It is hard to think of any other adequate way of ruling out the Pure 
Game. 
 
         (B6)  For any competitor of the Truth-Condition theory, it is hard to think 





(C1)  To rule out the Pure Placard Game, one must provide means whereby 
a speaker can produce a token meaning that so-and-so (thereby 
asserting that so-and-so or asking whether such-and-such or...). 
 
           (C2)  Any token (structured or unstructured) that means that P, for any P, is 
a sentence. 
 




           (C4)  A sentence that is true iff P has a truth-condition.   
 
         (C5)  To rule out the Pure Game, one must provide means for endowing a 
speaker‘s utterances with truth-conditions.   [C1-C4] 
 
6.  The anti-Verificationist argument of section 1 may seem to generalize fast:  ―If 
a sentence means that P, then that sentence is true iff P.  So on the Blah-Blah theory of 
meaning, ‗An electron has just passed through the cloud chamber‘ would be true iff 
[whatever the Blah-Blah-ist theory says that sentence means]; thus the Blah-Blah-ist 
theory assigns to that sentence, and to every other sentence to which it applies, a truth-
condition, and in particular a truth-condition that according to the theory is the sentence‘s 
meaning.  So, to put it provocatively, Blah-Blah-ism = the Truth-Condition theory plus 
some distinctive advice about how to determine what a given sentence‘s truth-condition is 
(though that advice may be bad, as we complained against the Verificationist).‖  
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Now, the Verification theory has been a somewhat special case in this discussion, 
because that theory triggers my assumption (C3) that if a sentence means that P, then the 
sentence is true iff P.  That in turn is because the Verification theory delivers meaning 
specifications for particular sentences that are couched in terms of ―that‖-clauses; a 
verification condition can itself be so complementized.
17
  Other theories lack the latter 
virtue; they do not show how to get from a specification of a sentence‘s ―use‖ (or 
whatever) to a ―means that‖ clause--and so those theories fall afoul of argument (C1)-
(C5).   
So the Verification theory is adequate only because it does deliver ―means that‖ 
clauses, and no theory that fails to do the same is adequate.  What the relevantly adequate 
theories have distinctively in common is that they do trigger (C3).  And that encourages 
Davidson‘s famous semi-rhetorical question: What does ―means that‖ add to ―is true iff‖ 
in the latter‘s stronger-than-truth-functional sense?  Absent a convincing answer, we 
should conclude that it is after all the sentence‘s truth-condition that is doing the work of 
being the sentence‘s meaning; that the truth-condition might also be the verification 
condition is incidental. 
But might there not be a convincing nonrhetorical Verificationist answer?  (I 
continue to discuss Verificationism here rather than ―Use‖ theories because it does 
without question deliver ―means that‖ clauses.  If a particular ―Use‖ theory also delivers 
them, then what follows should apply to it as well.)  Such an answer, so far as I can see, 
would have to take one of three forms: (i) to show that verification has a specifically 
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meaning-explanatory role to play, which role is not fulfilled by truth alone; (ii) to show 
that truth is problematic in a way that verification is not; or (iii) to show that truth-
conditions themselves are philosophically reducible to verification conditions.  Let us 
consider each of these options briefly in turn. 
(i):  It is sometimes complained against Truth-Condition theories that they divorce 
meaning from epistemology.  No such complaint could be made against the 
Verificationist, whose theory reduces meaning precisely to epistemology.   
But what legitimizes the complaint in the first place?  What did the 
epistemologizing of meaning explain that Truth-Condition theories do not?  There is no 
obvious candidate.  (One putative explanandum would be the alleged normativity of 
meaning: if meaning is normative, the Verification theory is well positioned to explain 
that, by reference to the underlying epistemic norms.  But (a) it is hardly obvious that 
meaning is at all normative; those who contend that meaning is normative tend to be those 
who already hold an epistemic theory of meaning.  And (b) I suspect that for any 
argument purporting to show that meaning is normative, a parallel argument would show 
that truth is normative also, thus depriving the Verificationist of the advantage there.
18
)   
(ii):  I know of two attempts to argue that truth is problematic in a way that 
verification is not: Michael Dummett‘s (1959, 1975, 1976) well-known case against the 
idea of allowing verification-transcendent truth-conditions into one‘s theory of meaning; 
and objections arising from recent deflationism about truth (e.g., Brandom (1983, 1994); 
Horwich (1990, 1999)). 
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On each of these points, I can only refer the reader to other works of mine.  Lycan 
(1984, pp. 248-57) rebuts Dummett‘s case at length.  Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan (2000) 
consider four deflationism-based objections to the Lewisian argument in particular, and 
find each entirely unconvincing.
19
  We conclude that either deflationism is compatible 
with the Truth-Condition theory,
20
 or deflationism is false (because incompatible with the 
unrefuted Lewisian argument‘s conclusion).  
(iii):  If truth-conditions are reducible to verification conditions, then one might 
insist that although sentence meanings are (indeed) truth-conditions, those are in turn 
verification conditions, and so what sentence meanings are at bottom is verification 
conditions.  (Strawson (1970) took just this line except on behalf of Grice rather than 
Verificationism, maintaining that although it is fine or at any rate harmless to say that a 
sentence‘s meaning is the characteristic condition under which the sentence is true, the 
sentence‘s being true can be understood only in terms of its being used to say something 
true, and saying must be understood in Gricean terms of communicating the contents of 
underlying propositional atttitudes.)    
I balk at the assumption that the transitivity of reduction renders the first stage of a 
two-stage reduction uninteresting or unimportant.  Suppose, e.g., that knowledge is 
reduced to a causal relation of a certain kind.  If causality is then reduced to something 
else, say to counterfactual relations, or to transfer of energy, that does nothing to diminish 
the epistemologist‘s achievement in having reduced knowing to causality.  Similarly, 
 24 
should truth-conditions prove reducible to verification conditions, that would take nothing 
away from the accomplishments of the Truth-Condition theory of meaning. 
 
I conclude that our refined version of Lewis‘ argument succeeds, and accordingly 
that linguistic meaning is at least truth-condition; any theory of meaning that rejects truth-
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1
 This paper was solicited and originally written for the Festschrift for M.J. Cresswell (Festschrift 
for Max Cresswell on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, Logique et Analyse, Vol. 46, No.181 
(2003)).  The paper was duly submitted and accepted by the editors; but through some 
extraordinary screwup in press, it was omitted from the volume.  I take the opportunity here to 
say what I would have said in my title footnote there:  ―Max Cresswell combines three great 
professional talents (I pass by his notable gifts as a stage actor): He is, of course, an 
accomplished logician; he has a linguist‘s ear for data and for verbal nuances; and, most 
importantly to me, he is a fine and acute philosopher, in any area of philosophy, on any topic, at 
any time.‖   
 
2
 The Verificationist may protest that there is still a question of explanatory priority; is the 
verification condition the meaning only because it is also the truth-condition, as I have implied, 
or is the truth-condition the meaning only because it is the verification condition?  I shall address 
this in section 6 below. 
 
3
 Departing from Carnap (1947), whose sentence intensions were simply functions from worlds 
(or rather, their state-descriptions) to truth-values, Lewis follows Montague (1968) and Scott 
(1970) in treating his intensions as functions from ―indices‖ to truth-values, an index being an 
n-tuple containing not only a world but a number of contextual features such as speaker and time, 
in addition.  This practice is criticized, effectively in my view, by Stalnaker (1968), who urges 
the two-stage determination process now associated with Kaplan (1977):  The contextual features 
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determine a Carnapian intension, and the latter intension given a world determines a truth-value.  
Cresswell (1972, 1973) sides with Stalnaker in this.  (Actually his way of representing the 
dependence of extension on context is elaborate and rigorous:  ―Contexts‖ are construed as 
propositions stating facts about particular uses of sentences, and functions are defined from such 
propositions to the extensions of the various sorts of indexical terms.  For later and more subtle 
work on indexicality, see Cresswell (1990, 1996).) 
 
4
 For discussion of the ontology of possible worlds, see Lycan (1994). 
 
5
 Alternatively, just a set of worlds, corresponding to the traditional notion of a proposition.  I 




 This of course ignores wh-questions, but wh-questions have true or false answers depending on 
the singular term that gets plugged into their matrices.  For example, ―Who robbed the diaper 
service?‖ generates the answer-class {―Alice robbed the diaper service,‖ ―Bob robbed the diaper 
service,‖...}, and is correctly or incorrectly answered by a member of that class accordingly as 
that member is true or false.  In like wise, ―When is the meeting?‖ generates {―The meeting is at 
1:00 p.m.,‖ ―The meeting is at 1:01 p.m.,‖...}.  And intuitively, the meaning of a wh-question is 
parasitic on the meanings of its admissible answers. 
 
7
 Of course, the term ―truth-condition‖ itself can also be used in a way corresponding to 
Kaplanian character, as in fact by Davidson (1967) and Lycan (1984, Ch. 3).   
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8
 Though it must be conceded to inferentialists and some other ―use‖ theorists that sentences 
containing indexicals have perfectly clear patterns of inferential relations, e.g., from ―You gave 
me that book‖ to ―You gave me a book,‖ ―Someone gave me that book,‖ etc.  
 
9
 Remember that here it is sentence-meaning we are discussing; the plausibility of Grice‘s (1969) 
analysis of speaker-meaning itself is beside the point.  (For objections to the Gricean theory of 
sentence-meaning, see Lycan (1991), but for a possible Gricean version of the Truth-Condition 
theory, see Lycan (2000, pp. 145-46).) 
  
10
 The view, self-consciously formulated, originated with Sellars (1963, 1967, 1969), though it 
owes debts to the later Wittgenstein and to Carnap.   
 
11
 Notoriously, Lewis (1972:209) suggested that they do: he proposed to understand ―Hooray for 
Porky‖ as ―I cheer Porky.‖  (Perhaps ―Hello‖ means ―I greet you,‖ ―Shame!‖ means ―I castigate 
you‖ and ―Damn!‖ means ―I curse.‖)   
Whether or not we are attracted to Lewis‘ view of the brief ritual utterances, Jonathan 
Cohen (1964) raised an enduring problem about the truth-conditions of explicit performatives:  Is 
―I state that I have never seen this man before‖ true iff the speaker has never seen the 
demonstrated man before, or iff the speaker does so state?  There are powerful arguments on 
each side.  Cresswell (1973, Ch. 14) defends the initially less plausible second view, but tries to 
make it palatable by adding that a speaker‘s tokening the sentence in an appropriate context 
―conventionally counts as‖ asserting simply that s/he has never seen the man before; see also 
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Sadock (1985).  After resisting this view for some years, I have come to accept a version of it 
(Lycan (1984, pp. 142-54; 2000, p. 184)).   
 
12
 The taxonomic term ―assertive‖ is Searle‘s (1979).  The illocutionary category of assertives 
includes ―most of Austin‘s expositives and many of his verdictives as well‖ (p. 13). 
 
13
 A quicker version of the following argument was given in Lycan (1984, pp. 244-46) and in 
Lycan (2000, pp. 95-97).  
 
14
 It would take scholarship and thought to place Brandom on one horn or the other.   
Horwich (1998, 2005) offers an interesting contrast, though his view is less well worked 
out.  Unlike Brandom, he emphasizes that individual expressions have meanings: a given 
expression‘s ―meaning property‖ is ―its use being governed by such-and-such regularity—or, 
more specifically, the property that every use of the word is explained in terms of the fact that we 
accept certain specified sentences containing it‖ (1998, p. 6, italics original).  For each word, 
there is a ―basic use regularity.‖  (Examples:  We tend to accept ―That‘s red‖ (if it is actually 
uttered) in the presence of a red thing; we accept ―p and q‖ iff we accept ―p‖ and we accept ―q.‖)  
But, n.b., ―accepting‖ a sentence is a psychological notion (pp. 94-96), rather than any form of 
actual social behavior; this is another departure from Wittgenstein and from Brandom.  I suspect 
that Horwich‘s view covertly introduces reference by way of the aboutness involved in the 
relevant mental contents; but as in Brandom‘s case, for present purposes we need not decide this.  
My argument being a dilemma, it does not matter which horn is actually grasped by any of its 
targets. 
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15
 Often when I have presented this placard-game argument to students, they have tried to find 
propositional meaning even in chess moves and tennis shots—suggesting; e.g., that a serve 
means (says!) ―Hit this back to me if you can‖ and that its return means (asserts) ―I‘m as good as 
you, sucker.‖  I think this is fanciful at best, but more importantly it is beside the point, if what is 
in question is the necessity of truth-condition for linguistic meaning.   
 
16
 I take this premise to be true, indeed trivial, as it stands, not question-begging or even 
contentious, even though the ―iff‖ is stronger than truth-functional.  (C3) alone does not entail 
that what it is for the sentence to mean that P is for it to be true iff P.   
 
17
 I used to formulate this comparative virtue of the Verification theory by saying that it tells us, 
not just what meaning is tout court, but the particular meanings of particular sentences, which 
could then be specified using ―that‖-clauses (Lycan. (2000, p. 118).  But that formulation was 
inaccurate.  The Verification theory does not by itself tell us the meanings of particular sentences, 
any more than does a ―Use‖ theory, because to get such a meaning one has to fill in one‘s own 
opinion as to what a given sentence‘s verification condition is.  (I waive the Quinean point that 
particular sentences do not even have belief-independent verification conditions.)  The point is 
rather that, no matter what one thinks is the verification condition of a given sentence, that 
condition will immediately deliver a ―that‖-clause.  
 
18
 Someone might further suggest that Verificationism explains entailment facts better than does 
the Truth-Condition theory.  According to the latter, a sentence S1 entails another S2 because S2 
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is derivable (in Tarskian style or in possible-worlds semantics as the case may be) from S1 taken 
together with the two sentences‘ containing truth-conditional semantics.  But is it not a deeper 
and better explanation to connect entailment to epistemology, by saying that any set of 
observations that verifies S1 also verifies S2?   
I think not—because it seems to me that the reason any set of observations that verifies 
S1 also verifies S2 is that S1 entails S2, not the other way around.  
 
19
 Two are especially worth mentioning.  First, the deflationist may say that although meaning 
and fact ―jointly‖ determine a sentence‘s truth-value, this is for a trivial and degenerate reason: 
that truth-value is already determined by fact alone; since the sentence‘s meaning is not involved 
in doing the determining, then either the inference from (1) to (2) is fallacious, or (3) is 
disputable.  To that we replied that even if deflationism holds, it simply does not follow that 
truth-value is determined by fact alone without regard to the sentence‘s meaning. 
Second, the deflationist may contend that to establish the full-blooded Truth-Condition 
theory, one needs to show more than that all meaningful sentences have truth-conditions.  One 
has to show that truth-conditions are what (partly) explain what it is for a sentence to have its 
meaning, which would require assigning truth an explanatory role, which in turn would be to 
abandon deflationism about truth.  We replied without taking a stand on that last premise (that to 
assign truth any explanatory role is to abandon deflationism):  Truth plays several explanatory 
roles in regard to meaning; whether that means we must reject deflationism is a disputed 
question. 
A third objection has been offered by Patterson (2007).  It makes a subtle point about the 
nature of definitions; I shall not address that point here, because I think its target is a stronger 
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claim than the one I, at least, meant to make in Bar-On et al. (2000).  However, Patterson implies 
a more straightforward criticism of the Determination Argument, one which has also been put to 
me by Ted Parent and others:  The move from (1) to (2) is not strictly valid.  A brick taken 
together with a possible world determines the brick‘s color (if any) at that world, but we should 
not conclude that a brick is at least a function from worlds to colors.  (A brick is not any type of 
function, not even one with a concrete appendage.)   —Right; I think I must swallow that.  
Rather, I should say, (2) is merely the obvious explanation of (1), given that the sentence 
meanings we are talking about are abstract entities in the first place.  
 
20
 Against received wisdom, which is incompatibilist on this point.  Bar-On and Horisk are 
incompatibilists, while I am a compatibilist; see our respective Postscripts in Beall and Armour-
Garb (2005). 
 
